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Chapter I—Introduction to the Politics of Electricity in the Dominican Republic 
 
This paper is a historical-anthropological analysis of electricity in the Dominican 
Republic.  That electricity is of every day value to people across the world is not a 
controversial statement; that electricity, viewed from within a specific geographic, 
political, or cultural perspective, has its own historical trajectory is less apparent.  The 
most prevalent terms by which electricity offers an analytical locus draw on issues 
pertaining to economics, infrastructure, and development.  However there is, as I argue 
here, more to electricity than such foci would have us believe.  If we agree that electricity 
has a value to consumers, an anthropological query would invite us to look at how this 
value operates within certain relationships: between consumers and generators, between 
generators and the state, between consumers and the state.  For instance, for consumers in 
the Dominican Republic reliant on the national grid for electricity, supply is problematic 
countrywide; with some regional variation, electricity can shut off upwards of seven 
times a day with each power outage potentially lasting a quarter of an hour or more .   1
Transmitted via power lines from its source in generation plants, electricity is a 
naturally occurring phenomenon whose control and manipulation vexed humans until the 
19 ​th​ century.  It is a commodity that circulates through the everyday lives of consumers in 
a fashion similar to any other manufactured good. On its journey electricity passes 
through a variety of politically and socially conditioned ‘regimes of value,’ to borrow 
Arjun Appadurai’s phrase, that provide electricity with what Appadurai has called a 
1 ​From my own observations in Barahona, a city of approximately 70,000 people located sixty kilometers 
east of the border with Haiti, power outages happened at least five times a day for the month I visited. 
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commodity’s ‘social life’ (Appadurai 1986).   Thus for the purposes of this paper I use 
electricity as a ‘cultural’ lens with which to view political, social, and economic shifts in 
the Dominican Republic that transpired over the course of the last half of the 20​th​ century. 
With electricity as a focal point I proceed to demonstrate how a changing economy and 
transformations in the relationship between the Dominican state and citizens culminated 
in the 1996 election of Leonel Fernandez and democratic support for his neo-liberal 
platform of embracing free-market capitalism and privatization.   For upwards of sixty 
years electricity was supplied to the national grid via the Dominican Electricity Company 
(CDE), which had been under the ownership of the Dominican state since 1955.  This 
changed in 1999 when Fernandez’s administration oversaw the privatization of the CDE 
and several other state-owned industries.   
The 1996 presidential elections were considered by many to be the first fair and 
democratic elections in Dominican history; to quote Jonathon Hartlyn, the elections were 
a “watershed” event (Hartlyn 1998:261). The central electoral board, charged with the 
responsibility of overseeing fair elections, was “committed to well-managed, honest 
elections” and for the first time since 1966 Joaquin Balaguer would not be running as a 
presidential candidate (Hartlyn 1998:261). Fernandez’s ascendance to the presidency of 
the Dominican Republic marked a turning point in Dominican politics away from the 
type of authoritarian rule that characterized the administrations of Joaquin Balaguer 
(1966-1978, 1986-1996) and his dictatorial predecessor Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961). 
Under the dictatorship of Trujillo the Dominican state acquired a burgeoning public 
sector via widespread seizure of privately owned industries.  
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Nationalization affected both domestic and foreign-owned businesses in the 
Dominican Republic but in the case of U.S.-owned industries such as the ​Compania 
Electric de Santo Domingo​, foreign interests became the target of Trujillo’s nationalist 
discourse that sought to justify nationalization in part as a protective gesture of a strong, 
sovereign Dominican state in opposition to the U.S. military intervention between 
1916-1924. Sovereignty and independence are narrative themes that run throughout 
modern Dominican history. Their origins are found in the occupation by Haitian forces of 
the east half of Hispaniola—at the time called Santo Domingo—which lasted from 1801 
to 1844, and, shortly after, in the brief period of annexation to Spain from 1861 to 1865. 
After Trujillo’s assassination in 1961, Balaguer became ​the ​ central figure in Dominican 
politics from 1965 through the 1990s.  Like Trujillo, Balaguer maintained a firm grip on 
the country’s economy with the help of state-controlled industries such as the CDE and 
the State Sugar Council, but due to a number of changes in the Dominican political 
economy, such as the growth of electricity consumption amongst both residents and 
businesses, the rising cost of oil in the 1970s, and the downsizing of the U.S. 
sugar-import quota for the Dominican Republic, the Balaguer state found it increasingly 
difficult to provide consistent electricity supply.  
The 1996 elections marked a turning point in Dominican history not only 
regarding the beginning of a new democratic politics and an increasingly engaged civil 
society.  As a presidential candidate for the Dominican Liberation Party, Fernandez had 
promised “to initiate a wide-ranging modernization program, including privatization of 
public enterprises” (Metz 2001:117).  With electricity supply the responsibility of the 
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CDE, government administrations were able to offer electricity as a gift to citizens by 
buffering the price of electricity from fluctuations in cost and shaping electricity supply 
for citizens into the responsibility of the Dominican state. Democratic support of 
Fernandez’s plans for economic and political reform marked a break with over a 
half-century of Dominican history in which a powerful state maintained control of much 
of the economy. 
During the first year of his presidency Fernandez presented a set of bills to the 
Dominican congress, which passed in June, 1997 as the Law for the Public Enterprise 
Reform, Law No. 141-97, whose purpose was to enable the privatization of multiple 
state-run enterprises, most notably the ​Consejo Estatal del Azucar ​ (State Sugar Council), 
a parastatal corporation that oversaw the Dominican sugar industry, and the ​Corporacion 
Dominicana de Electricidad ​(Dominican Electric Corporation, or CDE), which had a 
monopoly over the country’s energy sector and the national distribution grid .  An 2
argument that could be made—and one to which this paper presents a 
counterargument—is that privatization and the corresponding shifts in state policy that 
brought pushed for privatization was somehow inevitable due to economic pressures and 
ultimately little else.  As the result of significant debts inherited by the Fernandez 
administration in several state-owned enterprises, including but not limited to the 
electricity sectors, privatization was the only solution left on the table. Privatization was 
expected to be a panacea for the recurring problems encountered by the CDE throughout 
the 1970s, 80s, and 90s and analysts hypothesized that privatization would “end…years 
2  Nov. 7, 1996, Caribbean and Central American Regional Reports, Nov. 7, 1996.  Metz 2001:117-118. 
also see: ​http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/ internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr109830e.html​). 
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of inadequate and unreliable power supply” .  However, this perspective neglects the 3
dynamic history of relations between the Dominican state and Dominican citizens and 
how a state-owned industry such as electricity figured into this relationship.   
Before proceeding to the historical inquiry that comprises the body of this essay it 
is necessary to establish the theoretical parameters of my investigation.  In Chapter II I 
undertake a brief analysis of two concepts prevalent in anthropology—the gift and the 
commodity—to establish the relationship between citizens in the Dominican Republic 
and the Dominican state in terms of electricity production and consumption.  In 1954-55 
Rafael Trujillo struck upon electricity as a commodity with a growing consumer base and 
an increasingly important role to play in fostering a growing modern economy that could, 
through nationalization of the country’s electricity industry and the deployment of an 
accompanying state discourse of protectionism and nationalism, serve the interests of the 
dictator’s regime.  In essence electricity supply became a gift of the state, the 
consumption of which helped to shore up consent for Trujillo’s increasingly alienating 
policies which were, beginning in the 1950s, the catalyst for growing disdain for the 
dictator’s absolute grip on Dominican society.   
In Chapter III I look at the meaning given to electricity at the first moments of its 
introduction to the Dominican Republic in relation to political and economic 
developments that, in the eyes of some Dominican intellectuals, threatened national 
sovereignty.  Electricity became an available source of energy in urban locales in the 
early 1890s.  During this era, the growth of large-scale agriculture and efforts at 
3 ​Privatization International, July 1999. 
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modernization by the Dominican state under the administration of Ulises Heaureux 
imbued electricity with a significance that went beyond it being simply a sign of 
technological progress and development.  As the country became increasingly in debt to 
foreign lenders over the costs of railroad construction and other modernizing projects, 
electricity, newly accessible for a small but vocal section of the population, became the 
focus of debates surrounding the value and meaning of modernization and the 
implications for the nation of the growth of capitalist agricultural in which foreign 
investment, primarily coming from the U.S. after 1900, played a significant role. 
Electricity was thus incorporated into discussions pertaining to independence and 
sovereignty, themes that had discursive resonance when Trujillo sought to nationalize 
electricity in part as a means of reinforcing the patrimonial, protectionist appearance of 
his regime.   
Chapter IV then looks at the last years of the era of Trujillo, a period that came on 
the heels of an eight-year U.S. military intervention (1916-1924) and, prior to that, a 
decades-long U.S. Customs-Receivership, both of which represented a loss of 
sovereignty to many Dominican observers.  Under Trujillo, state discourse pertaining to 
nationalization of the country’s electricity industry employed an ideology of sovereignty, 
independence, and resistance to the incursion of external political and economic forces. 
In shaping his discourse around independence and sovereignty Trujillo was also placing 
nationalization in opposition to the United States military occupation from 1916-1924, 
also addressed in Chapter IV, and the customs-receivership that preceded the occupation. 
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Nationalization of the country’s electricity sector was called an act of Dominicanization  4
and Trujillo assured that all who desired electricity (in areas located in proximity to the 
national grid) could rely on the regime—and, after Trujillo’s assassination, the 
Dominican state—for their electricity needs, even if money and affordability was an 
issue.  Using electricity as the object of exchange, the regime thus entered into a gifting 
relationship with citizens; in turn it was expected that allegiance to the Trujillo regime 
would be secured. 
Electricity consumption grew throughout the years following Trujillo’s 
assassination in 1961 and as urbanization rates increased and the national electric grid 
spread outwards from urban centers such as Santo Domingo and Santiago, electricity 
became a normalized facet of everyday life for increasing numbers of Dominicans. 
Electricity supply continued to be the responsibility of the state, although it is important 
to note that electricity was no longer discursively politicized to the same degree that it 
was at the moment of its nationalization under Trujillo.  Nevertheless, electricity did not 
seize to be an important commodity of exchange between the Dominican state and 
citizens.  Chapter V traces the transforming relationship between the Dominican state and 
citizens during the post-Trujillo era as it pertains to the gifting of electricity supply. 
Joaquin Balaguer, essentially the second in command under Trujillo for the last years of 
the dictator’s regime, served as president of the republic from 1966-1978 and again from 
1986 to 1996.  Balaguer’s presidency was in large part a continuation of the authoritarian 
rule that had characterized the years under Trujillo.  Balaguer maintained a near-absolute 
4  ​See, Turits 2003:237-240, and Section IV of this paper for more on ‘Dominicanization.’  
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grip on the nation’s economy and subjected his political enemies to police surveillance, 
intimidation, and violence.  Changing patterns in electricity consumption amongst 
residential consumers and industrial/business interests, regarding the latter specifically in 
tourism and export-manufacturing (free-trade zones), made stable electricity supply an 
increasingly important concern for the Dominican state.  Citizens demanded electricity 
supply for their day-to-day consumption habits as lights, radios, televisions, air 
conditioners, and refrigerators became integrated into everyday life.  At the same time the 
electrical infrastructure of the CDE was deteriorating due to financial restraints facing the 
state-owned company and this impinged severely on the state’s ability to regularly supply 
electricity to consumers.   
 
Electricity and El Faro a Colon  
In Chapter IV, focusing on the last years of the Trujillo dictatorship, and Chapter 
V, focusing on the Balaguer administrations in the post-Trujillo era, I use the ​El Faro a 
Colon ​ (the Columbus Memorial Lighthouse) to illustrate the complex of shifting 
relationships involving electricity, the Dominican state, and Dominican citizens.  Under 
Trujillo state-sponsored spectacles of enormous proportions were utilized as strategic 
displays of national power and sovereignty, signifying to Dominicans that their country 
was no longer shackled to U.S. economic and political domination and that they had 
Trujillo, their benefactor, to thank.  Plans to construct the Columbus Memorial 
Lighthouse were indefinitely put on hold after the laying of its foundations in 1948, but 
the combination of electrical lighting and a state-sponsored construction project of such 
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immensity illustrates how electricity became entwined symbolically—through 
electricity’s use in displays of sovereignty and national strength—and literally—through 
practices of electricity consumption and control by the state—in the relationship between 
citizens and the state.   
In 1992 Joaquin Balaguer oversaw the completion of the Columbus Lighthouse 
for the 500​th​ anniversary of Columbus’s landing in the New World but decided to cancel 
its inauguration ceremony due to violent protests and social turbulence.  This unrest grew 
from an array of political and economic factors that ultimately stemmed from objections 
over the policies of the Balaguer administration.  Electrical power outages were a primary 
factor contributing to the ire of protesting citizens.  Under Trujillo the lighthouse was 
envisioned as a display of how far the Dominican Republic had come since the U.S. 
occupation of 1916-1924, and, of course, a testimony to the leadership and vision of 
Trujillo.  By 1992 the lighthouse had become indicative of the final dissolution of the 
authoritarian-patrimonial Dominican state that began with Trujillo and ended with 
Balaguer .  While power outages across the national grid affected millions of people 5
daily, the state under Balaguer saw fit to use electric lighting as an essential facet of the 
Columbus memorial.  Where as once electricity was utilized in order to show the state’s 
concern for its citizens, the absence of anything resembling consistent electricity supply 
made it clear to citizens in 1992 that the relationship which had existed under Trujillo, 
and until the tail end of Balaguer’s first term (1966-1978), had come to an end .  Four 6
5 For a discussion of the historicity of narratives of Christopher Columbus and Europe’s first encounter 
with the ‘New World’ see Trouillot 1995.  
6 ​In August, 1990 The Economist reported that electricity supply was down to four hours a day in Santo 
Domingo. 
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years after Balaguer cancelled and then significantly downsized the lighthouse 
inauguration Leonel Fernandez became president in the first elections since 1966 in 
which Joaquin Balaguer was not running as a candidate . The Columbus Memorial 7
Lighthouse thus acts as two nodes on a historical trajectory with which I am able to show 
how electricity has figured into transformations in the relationship between Dominican 
citizens and the state.   
In his book ​Cuban Counterpoint​ Fernando Ortiz effectively showed tobacco and 
sugar to be receptacles of Cuban history, commodities that embody the complex and 
often violent relationship of consumption and production tying colony to empire.  In 
essence narrating for these two commodities something similar to what Igor Kopytoff 
called a thing’s “cultural biography,” Ortiz’s project could be, and in many ways has 
been, extended to any number of goods and the societies in which they circulate 
(1986:64).  In this paper I use electricity as one such receptacle by which Dominican 
history, politics, and culture may be explored, demonstrating, I hope, a novel perspective 
of how a commodity of everyday importance to a wide array of people is central to 
transformations in relations between citizens and the states under which they live.   
 
 
 
 
 
7 ​Regarding the fairness and transparency of the 1996 elections, Hartlyn explains that it was widely agreed 
that the central electoral board in the Dominican Republic, charged with the responsibility of overseeing 
fair elections, was “committed to well-managed, honest elections” (Hartlyn 1998:261). 
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Chapter II -- Taming Electricity: Electricity as a Gifted Commodity 
  
Electricity is a commodity that circulates between the state and ‘residential’ 
electricity consumers in the Dominican Republic.  I am interested in how political and 
economic change, as well as changes in the consumption practices of electricity 
consumers, has interacted with this relationship.  This chapter outlines the theoretical 
framework that underlay the analysis I put forth in this paper.  I draw on Arjun 
Appadurai’s (1986) essay in ​The Social Life of Things: commodities in a cultural 
perspective​ as it allows us to approach electricity as a commodity—that is, as an 
economic good—circulating within specific culturally-conditioned “regimes of value.” 
This phrase encourages an analysis of commodities that pays attention to how 
commodities circulate within specific cultural and historical milieus and, as they circulate 
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between consumers and producers, what is their interaction with power—which in the 
case of the Dominican Republic and electricity is manifested in a succession of 
government administrations, which is to say in the state (1986:4).  Appadurai writes in 
order to “demystify the demand side of economic life,” which encourages a perspective 
of commodities that asks why certain commodities take on certain meanings, and how the 
circulation of certain commodities comes to interact with power, or politics in a general 
sense, and desire.  In his section on ‘desire and demand,’ Appadurai argues for a 
perspective of commodity circulation that sees “short-term and long-term patterns” in 
their circulation as being “subject to social control and political redefinition” (1986:6).   
Electricity, however, does not fit quite so comfortably into the framework 
established by Appadurai in his introductory essay, as he himself acknowledges.  The 
essays, explains Appadurai, are “titled” toward “specialized” and “luxury goods”; 
electricity would more likely be characterized as a “primary” or “bulk” commodity. 
Appadurai also notes that the essays obtain more to “goods” than to “services,” “though 
the latter are obviously important objects of commoditization as well” (1985:6).  Again, 
electricity seems to exemplify the latter.  What are the implications of endeavoring to 
study a primary, service-oriented commodity?   
Service commodities offer a comparative advantage over any other type of 
commodity as a strategic good for cooptation by governments.  Service commodities 
might otherwise be defined as goods within a market that are deemed necessary by a 
broad expanse of people on a regular basis.  This is in contrast to luxury goods, for which 
demand can rise tectonically and fall precipitously according to seemingly arbitrary 
14 
 
sociocultural whims .  Electricity in its commodity form is defined as a “service…that is 8
provided by a public utility” . Indeed, it is a service for which there is daily global 9
demand in this age of personal electronics such as computers, televisions, refrigeration, 
and air conditioning, to say nothing of an entire economy of production and consumption 
reliant upon its energy. 
Contemporary discourse surrounding electricity treats its service as an essential 
need in the modern world.  The most impoverished areas on earth are generally described 
as ‘lacking sanitation, clean water, and electricity’ and although this paper is peripherally 
interested in how electricity has become ‘naturalized’ as a bare necessity for human life, 
we cannot assume that demand for electricity, to use Appadurai’s words, is something 
“by its nature…fixed” (1986:29).  Appadurai points out a tendency to differentiate 
between demand and desire, viewing the former to be fixed and dictated by need, and the 
latter to be “infinite and transcultural” (1986:29).  He argues, however, that demand 
ought to be treated as an “aspect of the overall political economy of societies” (1986:29). 
It is the purpose of this paper to locate electricity as a commodity desired by Dominican 
consumers in relationship to the Dominican state’s efforts at controlling the meaning of 
electricity consumption, that is, of the desire for electricity.  The societies to which 
Appadurai is referring, in particular regarding the essays that follow his own, while they 
might exist within the boundaries of organized nation-states, function on a much smaller 
scale regarding commodity circulation than does a commodity such as electricity in the 
Dominican Republic.  This makes the effort of finding how electricity interacts with 
8 ​For one example among many in the United States, see the ‘Tickle Me Elmo’ craze of the mid-nineties​. 
9 ​American Heritage Dictionary 
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political power—presented here by the Dominican state—not particularly difficult.  The 
same cannot be said of uncovering how this interaction changes over time and the many 
political, economic, and social issues that affect this interaction.  
In part this paper uses electricity as a focal point to trace the dissolution of 
patrimonial relations between the Dominican state and its citizens. Jonathon Hartlyn 
(1998) made neopatrimonialism the focus of his study of the struggle for democratic 
politics in the Dominican Republic.  The differences between ‘patrimonialism’ on the one 
hand and ‘neopatrimonialism’ on the other pertain to a “combination of attributional 
similarities and typological differences in domination” (Hartlyn 1998:14).  The former 
term derives from Weber’s usage which referenced government rule based on the 
traditional authority of royal households.  The latter, ‘modern’ adaptation refers to a 
structure of political rule in which there is a “centralization of power in the hands of a 
ruler who seeks to reduce the autonomy of his followers by generating ties of loyalty and 
dependence, commonly through complex patron-client linkages” (Hartlyn 1998:14).  For 
the sake of clarity I will be using the term ‘patrimonial’ throughout this paper, though the 
differences between the two related terms should be noted.  
To establish part of the theoretical framework underlying the analysis I make of 
electricity and relations of the state to its citizens during and after the Trujillo era, it is 
helpful to look at the actions of the patrimonial state in terms of the gifting of electricity. 
The concept of the gift, made famous by Marcel Mauss, is generally reserved for use in 
‘primative’ or small-scale noncapitalist societies.  There is a tendency to see gift 
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exchange and commodity exchange as “fundamentally contrastive and mutually 
exclusive” (1986:11).  Appadurai writes: 
 
“Gifts, and the spirit of reciprocity, sociability, and spontaneity in which they are  
typically exchanged, usually are starkly opposed to the profit-oriented, 
self-centered, and calculated spirit that fires the circulation of commodities” 
(Appadurai 1986:11). 
   
My analysis suggests that the gifting of electricity was an essential aspect of the 
construction and solidification of the relationship between the patrimonial Dominican 
state and its citizens.  In her dissertation study of civic culture under the dictatorship of 
Rafael Trujillo, Lauren Derby (1998) pointed to the importance of gifting in creating a 
“culture of citizenship” between Dominican citizens and the Trujillo state.  To quote 
Derby: “sumptuary expenditure became the central reason of state” under Trujillo and in 
essence the dictator “merged the logic of the market with that of the gift” (1998:12).  The 
sort of ‘public largesse,’ to use Derby’s phrase, evident under Trujillo did not continue 
unchecked in the three decades separating Trujillo’s rule from the administration of 
Leonel Fernandez.  Electricity nevertheless remained an industry of primary importance 
to the Dominican state for two reasons: the growing importance of electricity for 
economic growth and development across the 1970s, 80s, and 90s and citizen’s 
expectations of state-supplied electricity, the origins of which lay in the gifting 
relationship established under Trujillo.   
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Privatization and Post-Cold War Economic Transformation  
The argument for the apparent inevitability of privatization in the Dominican 
Republic, mentioned briefly above in the introduction, has something to do with global 
political and economic transformations in the post-cold war era.  It is tempting to explain 
away the transition to a government administration with neo-liberal policies as fall out 
from the end of the cold war and the “recent stage of economic globalization” which 
followed (Lutz and Nonini 1999:77-78).  Regarding the economic transformations 
affecting nation-states and their interaction with the global economy in the years leading 
up to and following the end of the cold war (approximately 1992), Caterine Lutz and 
Donald Nonini write:   
 
“as a result of liberalization in transnational capital flows, of the creation of new 
institutions for regulating global and regional economies [such as the International 
monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and World Bank] and of privatization 
and contraction in state revenues, the capacities of nation-states to control their 
economies…and resident populations have been significantly reduced” (Lutz and 
Nonini 1999:78).   
 
From this perspective, states desire control of the national economy as means of 
controlling their citizenry, and the state’s ability to exercise this control is inhibited by 
international monetary organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and other lending 
institutions that make free market policies their baseline requirements for providing 
monetary assistance to a country.  It begins to look as if the hegemonic forces of 
international capitalism simply invade this country or that, subduing the state into 
accepting the infiltration of the global free market.  Little attention is given to the 
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question of why some countries chose to endorse politicians with neo-liberal policies that 
encourage the interaction of their country with these monetary institutions and the global 
market at large.   
By making electricity the focus of my analysis, I suggest that beginning roughly 
in the mid-1970s the Dominican state found it increasingly unable to manufacture control 
and consent of the population through its inability to maintain a vibrant electricity sector 
and provide reliable electricity supply.  Over time a situation developed from this slow 
dissolution of the relationship between state and citizens in which privatization and the 
“liberalization of transnational capital flows” was ​desired​ by both government and 
citizens as a solution to the problems plaguing an economy of state-controlled industries, 
especially pertaining to an industry such as electricity which had an everyday impact on 
the lives of citizens .   10
If we agree that there is nothing inevitable about privatization, a fact that is 
testified to by the more than fifty years of state-ownership of multiple industries in the 
Dominican Republic, we must ask why the neo-liberal shift brought by Fernandez in 
1996 came about when it did.  Why was privatization not pursued at an earlier moment, 
and why, after decades of patrimonial  state policies with which the state acted as the 11
protector of its citizens against growing market prices of goods such as electricity, did 
voters chose to endorse Fernandez’s plans for relinquishing state control of the economy 
10 ​Privatization was not the economic panacea some expected it to be.  The subsequent struggle for the 
Dominican Republic to adapt to a privatized, relatively neo-liberal​ ​economy is worth investigating at 
another time, though for the purposes of this paper I am most concerned with how this pathway became a 
desirable one for administrative policy and supported by a Dominican electorate.   
11 ​This term is covered in more detail below in Section II.  
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to global market forces and foreign ownership?  By looking at electricity and its position 
in the relationship between the Dominican state and Dominican citizens I show how the 
ability of the state to maintain its interventionist-protectionist policies were impinged 
upon by a number of factors pertaining to changes in the national economy, in political 
relations between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic, and in changing patterns of 
electricity consumption amongst Dominican consumers.  By making electricity a lens 
through which to view political and economic change over time, I provide a ‘ground 
based’ perspective that deals with an everyday issue—electricity supply—to offer one 
approach to understanding the political and economic shift that came with Fernandez’s 
1996 election.   
As the Dominican economy underwent a process of ‘diversification’ in the 
post-Trujillo years of the early 1970s, emphasizing mining, export manufacturing, and 
tourism in the form of all-inclusive resorts and hotels, electricity demand grew apace with 
these electricity-intensive industries . By the mid-1980s sugar, for a century the 12
country’s staple commodity crop, had been surpassed in revenue-earning power by the 
tourist industry of hotels and resorts spreading across the northern and eastern coasts of 
the republic.  The beginning of the modern tourist industry in the Dominica Republic, 
defined here as the movement in government policy toward being able to accommodate 
in resorts and hotels large numbers of vacationers, can be traced to the 1940s under the 
Trujillo regime.  Although the number of tourists visiting the Dominican Republic waxed 
and waned through the Trujillo assassination (1961), a civil war (1965) and subsequent 
12 ​Metz 2001:111. 
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U.S. military intervention, in 1984 revenue from tourism surpassed the earnings of the 
sugar industry .  13
The first free trade zones were established in the 1970s, the number of which 
grew into the 1980s and 90s.​  ​During the 1980s the number of people employed in free 
trade zones grew from 16,000 to near 100,000 (Metz 2001:111).  This is not to say that 
sugar ceased to be an important export crop for the national economy, but through the 
rising dominance of tourism and export-manufacturing the Dominican state found itself 
in a precarious position regarding electricity supply and generation.  It became 
increasingly difficult for the state-owned CDE to balance residential consumer demand 
with the growing electrical needs of resorts, hotels, and manufacturing industries.  As 
industries began to use private generators to overcome the unreliability of the national 
grid and the CDE, losing out on the potential revenue of these same industries, struggled 
to meet the rising demand of residential consumers, the state-citizen relationship that had 
existed in terms of electricity supply since the 1950s began to dissolve.  The stage was 
thus set for a corresponding political shift, which came with Fernandez’s democratic 
election and the neo-liberal, free market policies his administration encouraged. 
 
Thinking About the Politics of Electricity  
In his book ​Networks of Power​, Thomas Hughes placed the spread of grid 
electricity power systems across three major cities at the turn of the 20​th​ century—Berlin, 
London, and Chicago—in a social context that addressed how, among other things, 
13 ​Metz 2001:111. 
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politics, technological development, and business interests uniquely affected the growth 
of each city’s power system.  Hughes writes that “all three [cities] had the same pool of 
technology to draw from, but because the geographical, cultural, managerial, engineering, 
and entrepreneurial character of the three regions differed, the power systems were 
appropriately varied as well” (Hughes 1983:17).  In each city growth of its power system 
was compelled and/or inhibited by certain characteristics unique to each region; in the 
case of London, one such characteristic was the city’s exceptionally (for the time) large 
population of 7.25 million people and its “extremely complicated administrative structure 
that defied comprehension by non-Londoners and reform-minded Londoners alike” 
(1983:229).  Politics is indeed very much a part of Hughes analysis, but the degree to 
which politicians used electricity supply as a political tool of some sort at the highest 
levels of the state is not known.  Hughes does however provide us with a valuable 
starting point for thinking about the interaction between politics, citizens, and electricity, 
but in the case of the Dominican Republic further questions must be asked.  How does 
nationalization affect the growth of power systems and consumer access to electricity 
supply?  And how does electricity supply—when under the jurisdiction and operation of 
the state—interact with and influence the relationship between citizens and the state? 
How might electricity supply be used by the state as a political tool, one that touches the 
lives of a wide swath of a population on a daily basis?  
  In the Dominican Republic, electricity generation and distribution was seized 
upon by the Trujillo state via nationalization of the country’s electricity industry. 
Discursively this act was presented as an act of nationalism, a gesture of good will by the 
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patrimonial state to its citizens.  The ability of the state to use electricity in this symbolic 
manner depended upon the state’s ability to follow through with supplying electricity to 
the public.  Among other factors, the decline of sugar prices and a rise in oil prices in the 
1970s and bureaucratic inefficiency severely limited the growth and upkeep of the 
country’s electricity system as demand for electricity by consumers and businesses 
continued to grow.  As electricity supply became increasingly problematic, this impinged 
on the ability of the state to gift electricity—a commodity that day-by-day grew more 
essential to people’s lives—leading to a collapse of the gift exchange relationship 
essential to the patrimonial state.  When in the 1980s the state found itself unable to 
provide constant electricity supply, Balaguer nevertheless attempted to construct a 
massive, state-sponsored memorial to Christopher Columbus that, despite the country’s 
problematic electricity situation vis-a-vis consumers reliant upon the national grid, would 
use multiple high-power spotlights (and therefore a large quantity of electricity) to make 
a luminescent cross in the sky.  In the eyes of Dominican citizens, problematic electricity 
supply was made to reflect all the more harshly on the state than it otherwise might have.   
Less than three years later in April, 1995 the offices of the CDE were raided by protestors 
and a year after that, in 1996, Leonel Fernandez was elected president .   14
 
 
 
 
14 ​Latin America Weekly Report, April 6, 1995 
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Chapter III – Power and Meaning: Electricity and Early Modernization  
 
Everywhere that its energy is manifested on earth—be it as a bolt of lightening or 
energy generated by a rotating magnetic coil—electricity is bound by unchanging laws of 
nature that govern its physical properties and attributes.  In this chapter I locate electricity 
in the context of Dominican history, moving electricity from its undifferentiated natural 
state to its earliest position as a commodity in the Dominican Republic.  I establish the 
relationship of electricity and its meaning as a commodity to cultural and political issues 
pertaining to modernization and national sovereignty in the late 19​th​ century Dominican 
Republic.  These dual themes of modernization and sovereignty present common threads 
that run through Dominican history in general and through the Dominican history of 
electricity in particular.  By linking the advent of electricity as a controlled and 
consumable source of energy in the Dominican Republic with transformations in the 
country’s economy and changing geopolitical relations with the United States, this 
section establishes the conceptual framework for the analysis carried out in the following 
sections.  Far from presenting an unequivocally positive signifier of ‘modernization,’ in 
the 1890s electricity was bound up with issues of political and economic sovereignty that 
would lend historical meaning to the discourse later used by the Dominican state under 
Rafael Trujillo to exert control over electricity generation and attempt to influence the 
very meaning of electricity consumption.   
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Beginning in the 1890s electricity provided a source of energy for street lamps 
and telegraph, among other machines, presenting a tangible experience of the country’s 
modernizing landscape. During the late 19​th​ century, electricity, and modernization in 
general, presented both the possibility of a new era and a looming threat to the nation’s 
well-being as capitalist agriculture and large-scale sugar production began to transform 
the country .  Under the regime of Ulises Heureaux (1887-1899), the Dominican state 15
regularly intervened to stimulate modernization in the form of road building, construction 
of telephone and telegraph lines, and the spread of railroads .  Funding for these projects 16
often came from foreign loans which resulted in the state becoming increasingly 
beholden to foreign capital.  This created a context in which the appearance of electric 
lighting and telegraph, among other technologies, in urban areas such as Santo Domingo 
and Santiago was not accepted as an unambiguous sign of progress.  
 Electric lighting made its first appearance in the Dominican Republic during an 
era in which rapid and far-reaching change affected multiple facets of Dominican society. 
Electricity did not have an immediate impact on the production of sugar or tobacco—the 
country’s two primary crops—but its introduction must be seen in conjunction with the 
political and economic transformations addressed in this section . Michiel Baud (1987) 17
traces the growth of the Dominican sugar industry in the last quarter of the 19​th​ century in 
part to “a series of ‘modernizing’ governments” which “stimulated capital investment and 
offered tax exemptions” to new businesses.  The dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux was the 
15 ​See Martinez-Vergne (2005) for a summary of the impact and implications of changing agricultural 
production practices in the late 19​th​ century Dominican Republic. 
16 ​Hoetink (1972) covers in detail the changes in what he has called the Dominican communication 
structure which includes railroads, telegraph, and telephone. 
17 ​The processing of sugar depended on mills with presses run either by steam or human labor.  
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“culmination” of this political trend.  Effects of the industrialization of sugar production 
were most perceptible in the south of the country, primarily in the areas around and 
between Santo Domingo and La Romana, but the modernizing trend in the country and 
an influx of foreign and domestic business interests impacted rural communities as well. 
In this era as well the United States began to grow involved as its investors and 
companies were drawn to the country’s growing economy.   
 
Electricity, Modernization, and Sugar Under Heureaux 
Electricity’s relationship to large-scale sugar production found expression under 
Heureaux when urbanization, the country’s growing wealth from sugar production, and 
an authoritarian government pushed for modernization.  In no small part due to the 
Republic’s growing debt and an increase of foreign capital and influence in the 
economy—corollary affects of modernization and the expanding sugar 
industry—electricity became a site at which modernization and the value of progress was 
set against the symbolic and real costs incurred by the nation.  “Neither the 
transformation nor the ideology of progress,” writes Teresita Martinez-Vergne, “was 
exempt from conflict.” 
 
“Sugar had brought, along with economic prosperity, the dispossession of  
peasants in some areas, the importation of workers from the West Indies, foreign 
investment, and other changes about which even the proponents of modernization 
were uneasy” (Martinez-Vergne 2005:1).   
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As a commodity imbued with cultural significance, the meaning of electricity’s 
availability as a consumable energy source within the context of late 19​th​ century 
Dominican history is contested and dynamic. Electricity was not an unambiguous symbol 
of progress but instead, due to the political and economic circumstances under which it 
was introduced, electricity embodied intimations of a movement toward the loss of 
financial and political independence to foreign interests and the alienation of a largely 
rural population dependent upon access to lands in the process of being absorbed by 
large-scale sugar production.  
Baud (1987) amply summarizes from a global perspective “the structural changes 
in the capitalist world system during the second half of the nineteenth century” which 
resonated through “peripheral economies” such as the Dominican Republic’s and 
throughout the Caribbean and Latin America: 
 
“Improvements in transportation and the increasing demand for tropical consumer  
goods in the industrializing countries caused unprecedented growth in the 
production of tropical export crops and a consequent international movement of 
agricultural commodities…Increased competition for tropical commodities among 
industrializing countries made controlling their production more attractive.  In the 
Dominican Republic, this goal meant fostering sugar plantations that were mostly 
financed by Cuban and U.S. capital” (Baud 1987:135-140). 
 
Lauren Derby has also pointed out that it was during this period, beginning in the late 19​th 
century and extending up to the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961), that state 
growth resulting from “increased government revenues and a new liberal vision of the 
state” began to take place (1994:501). By the end of the 19​th​ century sugar was beginning 
to outpace tobacco as the commercial crop upon which the country would rely for its 
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economic base (although, as Baud notes, sugar cane production was not yet the dominant 
force in the Dominican economy) (1987:135).  At the same time the country was finding 
itself subjected to the growing economic and political influence of United States.  Both 
factors had significant affect on the development and spread of electrical power in the 
Dominican Republic and upon the cultural implications of electricity within early 
Dominican understandings of modernity.   
H. Hoetink (1972) has documented the introduction of electric lighting and other 
changes in what he calls ‘the structure of communication’ in the Dominican Republic. 
Although the Dominican Republic in the late 19​th​ was “unevenly modernized,” where 
electricity consumption was enabled by the construction of electric street lamps and 
telegraph lines electricity became modernization made tangible.  In 1893 the city council 
of Santo Domingo sought to issue bonds for the purpose of installing electric lighting in 
urban areas.  Three years later the government of the province of Santo Domingo 
received from the Ministry of the Treasury and Commerce a monthly sum “in order to 
attend to the expense of electric light for the citadel, military hospital, province 
government palace, [and] police barracks” (Hoetink 1972: 47-63).  In this way electricity 
became a commodity available to people living in urban areas and working in 
government occupations.  Other changes in the structure of communication in the 
Dominican Republic included the construction of railroads, the building of telegraph lines 
and the introduction of schools for “practical telegraphy,” as well as the first telephone 
conversation in 1886 between an Electric Company administrator and the Rector of the 
Colegio San Luis Gonzaga.  
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Between 1844—the year the Dominican Republic gained independence from a 
Haitian interim government—and 1880, the northern cities of Santiago and Puerto Plata 
became important commercial centers due to the development of the region’s tobacco 
industry.  The social implications of transformations in agricultural practices and state 
efforts of modernizing the country are evident in the growing importance of Santo 
Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic.  During colonial times Santo Domingo 
had been home to the Spanish colonial government but was dwarfed in financial 
importance by northern cities in the tobacco-producing Cibao region.  It was not until the 
last two decades of the 19 ​th​ century that Santo Domingo became the country’s 
commercial center, resulting from the development of the country’s modern sugar 
industry.  As Frank Moya Pons (1994:194-194) notes, between 1875 and 1895 more than 
twenty sugar mills were installed in the region surrounding Santo Domingo, helping to 
transform it into the country’s most important city.  The urban population each of 
Santiago, Puerto Plata, and Santo Domingo did not exceed 10,000 in the 1880s.  Yet by 
the 1920s Santo Domingo’s population had reached approximately 40,000 which helped 
bring the country’s urban population to 16.6 percent of the total population.  
The number of people calling Santo Domingo home began to grow with the 
commencement of large-scale sugar production.  According to Hoetink, in the years 
between 1875 and 1882 thirty centralized cane plantations, or ‘cane haciendas,’ were 
established.  Though the investment of “some considerable domestic capital” was 
important to the growth of haciendas, an influx of “large amounts of foreign capital 
imported by…Cuban immigration” also contributed significantly (Hoetink 1972:4).  And 
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with the cane haciendas Santo Domingo grew as an increasing number of businesses such 
as machine shops, apothecaries, and commercial factories opened, placing the city on 
pace to beat out Santiago, despite it having the potential to become “a second Chicago,” 
in size and commercial importance (1972:44).   
 
The Costs of Modernization: U.S. Customs-Receivership 
The investment of foreign and domestic capital during the tenure of Heureaux’s 
dictatorship helped along “the hand of Progress” in several significant facets of 
Dominican society.  With the construction of new roads connecting sugar plantations 
built east of Santo Domingo and railroads stretching through the Cibao region to the Bay 
of Semana in the east, urban and rural communities became connected to a degree 
hitherto unseen (1972: 52-56, 1995:454).  These displays of modernization, however, 
came at a price as the Dominican Republic acquired increasing amounts of debt with 
foreign business interests.  By amassing government debt to foreign lenders, Heureaux 
moved the country toward the customs-receivership established in 1905 by the United 
States government after acquiring the debt owed to the San Domingo Improvement 
Company.  “The entrance of the San Domingo Improvement Company into Dominican 
finances gave the United States unprecedented influence over the country.” (1995:272). 
Under Heureaux, Westendorp & Company of Amsterdam, Holland sold its interests in 
the Dominican Republic to the San Domingo Improvement Company thus financially 
embroiling a company from the United States in the economic affairs of the Dominican 
government.   
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The San Domingo Improvement Company consisted of a group of United States’ 
capitalists, several of which were government officials.  Intending to construct a railroad 
connecting Santiago and Puerto Plata Heureaux had secured two substantial loans in 1890 
and 1892 from Westendorp & Company.  With Westendorp & Company moving toward 
bankruptcy, in March of 1893 the San Domingo Improvement Company obtained, with 
Heureaux’s consent, full ownership of Westendorp & Company’s interests in the 
Dominican Republic.  By year’s end the government was 17 million pesos in debt, in part 
due to the civil war that preceded Heureaux’s presidency, but due also to the subsequent 
loans Heureaux secured as the condition under which he would accept the transfer of 
interests from one company to the other (1995:271-278). By the first years of the 1900s it 
was clear to the San Domingo Improvement Company that the Dominican Republic was 
not in financial shape to repay the debts the Company had acquired.  Appeals to the U.S. 
government to intervene in the situation lead to the establishment of a 
customs-receivership in 1905 whereby all goods entering and leaving the Dominican 
Republic were taxed by U.S. custom houses with the intention of settling the country’s 
outstanding debts.   
In several instances the press showed its enthusiasm for a modernized Dominican 
Republic, imagining that the industrialization of sugar production and technological 
developments would offer a counterweight to political infighting and instability.  In 1877, 
too early perhaps to see the government’s financial problems that lay ahead, the ​Gaceta 
de Santo Domingo ​ ran a series of articles covering changes in the technology of sugar 
production whose title suggested such improvements would be “la salvacion del pais,” 
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while the first telephone call in the Dominican Republic 1886 garnered an emphatic 
“Hurray for progress” from an article in ​La Cronica—Religion, Ciencias, Artes y 
Literatura  (1987:141, 1972:58).  However, not all with outspoken opinions were as 18
willing to as the press to imagine modernization as being the miraculous salvation of their 
country.   
Although often times reliant upon government appointments, a number of the 
country’s most prominent intellectuals, or “men of letters” as Martinez-Vergne names 
them, took seriously their position as members of the “intelligentsia” and worked to 
develop a “common sense of nationhood” (2005:3).  Despite being under the employ of 
the oppressive government of Ulises Heureaux, not all of the country’s intellectual elite 
was hesitant to express their reservations about the direction in which the country was 
moving.  Jose Ramon Lopez and Pedro Francisco Bono in particular both expressed in 
writing and speeches their concern with the country’s peasantry as United State’s capital 
and other foreign business interests contributed to the growing sugar industry that 
threatened “the small independent farmers on whose progress the traditional wealth of the 
country depended” (1995:261; 2005:5).  To conclude this section I look at an article 
published in ​El Eco de la Opinion​, a respected newspaper published in the Dominican 
Republic at the end of the 19 ​th ​century.  In this article we are able to observe the contours 
of electricity’s relationship to issues of sovereignty and discussions of the toll taken by 
modernization on the national body of the Dominican Republic. 
La Senora Electricity 
18 “At 5 p.m. the Rector of the Colegio San Luis Gonzaga greeted Sr. Naasson, administrator of the E;ectric 
Company, from his school by means of the telephone. Hurray for Progress!” 
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In an article published by a Dominican correspondent in New York City 
electricity figures prominently as a central literary device for discussing the costs of 
modernization—represented by the recently developed ability in the United States and 
Europe to control and harness electrical power, a development that was just reaching the 
Dominican Republic in the 1890s—and of foreign financial influence in the republic, 
especially regarding the United States.  The author explains that electricity is a 
mysterious, ubiquitous force that appears when he shuffles his feet across the carpet of 
his apartment and that the subsequent static spark can be used to light the fuse of his 
stove.  He explains that electricity is an indigenous force of nature located within all 
humans.  This force, he continues, can cure migraines through the application of an 
electric charge to the head, but electricity will just as easily kill people under different 
circumstances; electricity is thus both ‘fairy’ and ‘devil.’  The author proceeds to explain 
theories regarding the power of electricity to help agriculture when a current is applied to 
the soil.  The article then introduces electricity as a female character (​la senora 
electricidad) ​in an exchange with Thomas Edison, whose relationship to electricity is part 
of the canon of scientific history .   19
Martinez-Vergne has analyzed the story in terms of representations of gender 
relations at the end of the 19 ​th​ century in the Dominican Republic. Her reading presents 
one layer of interpretation to which I here add a second.  My intention is to emphasize 
that part of the exchange that implicates electricity, represented by the woman Electricity, 
as a guilty partner in the changes affecting the country via modernization and the support 
19  ​Beyond scientific history, Hughes has shown the social-technological history behind Edison and 
electricity.  
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of politicians such as Heaureux of bringing technological progress to the Dominican 
Republic. The woman Electricity is accused by Edison of being lascivious and 
uncontrollable, having passed through the hands of Italian, German, and French men. 
Edison, however, is able to ‘tame’ Electricity, which results in Edison being able to 
exploit Electricity; to “treat her as a wretch” and make “her work from six to six as if she 
were black.”  Martinez-Vergen explains that, “the reader is expected to immediately 
reject as unthinkable” the comment about Edison treating Electricity “like an African 
slave.”  Electricity blames herself for falling for a “Yankee” but despite being exploited 
and degraded by Edison, Electricity does not rebel against him, leading the author to call 
her “tyrannical.” Edison stands as a white foreigner from the United States, an arrogant 
and disrespectful man who through his exploitation of La Senora Electricity calls into 
question her very loyalty to the Dominican Republic: despite exploiting her (and, through 
her, the nation ) and “living through her effort,” Electricity does not “rebel against her 20
loved tyrant” and for that is a “shameless scoundrel.”   
As I mentioned above, the article’s author explains his perspective that electricity 
is indigenous to humans and the very soil of the earth, located in the brain and in minerals 
alike.  Thomas Edison has not brought electricity to the Dominican Republic because it 
was always there.  However, Thomas Edison, the Yankee, appears to be the only person 
able to ‘tame’ La Senora.  What we might glean from this allegorical encounter is the 
author’s somewhat cryptic acknowledgment that ‘modernization’ in the late 19​th​ century 
Dominican Republic came at a certain cost for the Dominican nation.  In the story 
20 The female body as symbolizing the nation’s body is explored by Derby (1998) through an analysis of 
the ceremony, celebration, and ritual surrounding Trujillo’s daughter in the 1950s.  
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modernization involves sacrificing the honor, respect, and sovereignty of the national 
body, represented here by the subjugation of the woman Electricity, to the powerful 
forces of progress and capital being exerted by Europe and the United States. The reader 
is left to judge for him or herself whether it is worth paying the price of ‘taming’ 
electricity when this necessitates the presence of a domineering white American who 
forces Electricity to “do something filthy.” The role performed by Edison, a white foreign 
(American) male, demonstrates a perspective that is weary of the price of modernization, 
estimated in this instance at foreign, racist domination. 
With this story in mind we can see how the introduction of lights, electric 
telegraph, and other devices that functioned through electricity being controlled and made 
to do work (that is, made to be consumed) signaled to some Dominicans their own 
subjugation to forces beyond their control.  The origins of these forces were foreign, not 
indigenous.  The author of the story appears more or less ambivalent, unwilling to offer a 
normative evaluation of the subjugation of electricity to Thomas Edison—that is, of the 
Dominican Republic to external forces of modernization—but it is clearly portrayed as a 
potentially violent and degrading process.  The allegory thus illustrates not only “men’s 
problematic associations with women,” but, as I have argued, an apprehension toward the 
meaning of a modernizing Dominican Republic, embodied here in a female character 
called Electricity.   
We have seen that electricity was introduced to urban areas of the Dominican 
Republic as part of Ulises Heaureux’s efforts at modernizing the country at a time when 
large-scale, industrialized sugar production was growing and the amount of foreign 
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capital invested in the country was increasing.  Electricity was a new commodity 
signifying modernization for those who lived and worked in urban areas, especially in 
buildings with ties to the government, but for some electricity was implicated in changes 
that hinted at something ominous on the horizon.  This looming specter appeared in the 
form of the Customs-Receivership and the intervention of the United States military and 
a military government.  With electricity’s relationship to modernization and the threat to 
Dominican sovereignty established, in the next section I look at how electricity became a 
more widely disseminated and politicized commodity under Trujillo as his regime, 
amounting wealth to a degree never before seen in the country, sought to sustain its 
nationalist-populist project against foreign domination.  This took place as the regime’s 
policies, in the last decade of Trujillo’s rule, simultaneously undermined its own 
credibility with the Dominican population. 
 
 
Chapter IV – Electricity and the Dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo 
 
In this chapter I explore the dual mobilization of electricity under the dictatorship 
of Rafael Trujillo, first as part of state-sponsored projects displaying the symbolic 
strength of the nation, and second as a political tool to shore up support for the regime 
through nationalization of the electricity industry and paternal-nationalist discourse.  The 
Columbus Memorial Lighthouse (El Faro a Colon) is demonstrative of an instance in 
which electricity was to be utilized in symbolic representations of the strength, 
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independence, and modernity of the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.  Although 
construction for the five-story, 210-meter long cross-shaped lighthouse stopped shortly 
after its foundations were laid in 1948, the Memorial Lighthouse provides a lens with 
which to view the implications of electricity’s political mobilization via nationalization. 
The Dominican state’s acquisition of the means of electricity generation and distribution 
in 1955 served the interests of Trujillo’s nationalist-populist project but nationalization 
would have implications reaching far beyond the dictator’s tenure, as we will see below 
in Section V.  
The Columbus Memorial Lighthouse is a symbol with multiple meanings, one of 
which pertains to the Dominican Republic’s Spanish-Catholic heritage through its tie to 
Christopher Columbus, another which represents a Pan-American vision of unity between 
Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  These meanings are 
significant and worth investigating in another study, but I am interested in the changing 
political-economic conditions under Trujillo’s dictatorship—as they pertain to 
electricity—that made the (potential) construction of such as massive project a politically 
viable undertaking for Trujillo’s regime.  The decision to construct the lighthouse is an 
early display of the ‘magical modernity’ of the Dominican state under Trujillo, about 
which Lauren Derby (1998) has explored in great depth.  Derby identifies the World Fair 
of Peace and Brotherhood sponsored by the Trujillo state in 1955 as the epitome of this 
magical modernity, but Trujillo’s intention of building the lighthouse shows a preceding 
moment in which electricity and the relative wealth of the Trujillo state combined to 
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emphasize the distance between, among other events, the U.S. military intervention of 
1916-1924 and the reformation of the Dominican state under Trujillo.   
With powerful beams of light emitting the shape of a cross thousands of feet into 
the sky, the lighthouse would serve to connect the ‘newly modern’ Dominican Republic 
under Trujillo with the country’s historical memory of being home to the first capital 
established by Europeans in the New World .  As a state project conceived prior to the 21
nationalization of the electricity industry in 1955, the lighthouse presents a contrast 
between the state’s two-fold mobilization of electricity, first as a means for projecting 
outward the modernity of the Dominican Republic, and second as a symbol of the 
Trujillo regime’s orientation toward nationalist-paternalism in the face of the dictator’s 
growing accumulation of capital at the expense of Dominican citizens.  In the late 1940s 
and early 1950s under the economically prosperous Trujillo regime and its discourse of 
nationalist-populism, a perceived alignment of desires existed between citizens and the 
state.  This alignment of desires was manifested through what Turits (2003) has called an 
‘alternative modernity’ which saw the regime supporting rural peasants against 
encroaching sugar interests.  However, as Trujillo began to consolidate the economy of 
the Dominican Republic into a private state-owned business the modernity that had 
served to support his regime, especially amongst the rural peasantry, began to unravel. 
21 ​Christian Krohn-Hansen (2001) has explored the racist implications of El Faro a Colon through its 
symbolic power as a memorial to Christopher Columbus.  El Faro a Colon serves as a testament to the 
desire of Dominican political elites and the state to construct ‘Dominicanness’ in terms of a heritage linked 
to white Europeans.  This equating of ‘Dominican’ with ‘white’ is a problematic site of exclusion from 
political constructions of what it means to be Dominican.  This goes especially for Dominicans with known 
Haitian ancestry and for Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.   
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Nationalization of the electricity industry became one way of attempting to reassert this 
modernity of populism and maintain support for the regime’s policies.  
 
U.S. Military Intervention, 1916-1924 and Sovereignty Regained 
Before proceeding to electricity’s position in the era of Trujillo it is necessary to 
outline the period of United States intervention as it set the political and economic 
conditions for Trujillo’s rise to power and would act as a backdrop for nationalization and 
Trujillo’s discourse of protectionism vis-a-vis foreign influence in Dominican politics 
and business .  If we recall that a customs-receivership was established in 1905 after the 22
San Domingo Improvement Company acquired the debt owed by the Dominican 
Republic to European interests after the dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux. In November 
1916 the United States, through the persona of navy commander Captain Harry S. Knapp, 
declared the establishment of a U.S. military government in the Dominican Republic. 
With Knapp as Military Governor, the legislative and executive branches of the 
Dominican government “disappeared.”  Executive orders issued by the military 
government prohibited Dominicans from occupying any cabinet posts related to control 
of the police or military arms of the government.  By July 1916 the U.S. military had 
been present in the Dominican Republic for two months, having landed troops on 
Dominican soil in early May of that year.  With U.S. troops present the Dominican 
congress elected Federico Henriquez y Carvajal president in July.  By November 1916 
22 The history covered in the paragraph that follows is taken from Calder 1984:8-12.   
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the United States decided on military intervention after ​caudillo ​political in-fighting 
resumed despite the occupying military presence.   
  The U.S. military government allowed for a provisional Dominican government 
to regain administrative control in October 1922 and two years later, searching for a way 
to extricate itself from the occupation, Horacio Vasquez became president as the United 
States withdrew from the country, remaining in power until his overthrow by the 
conspiring of Rafael Estrella Urena, a politician from Santiago, and Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo Molina, a commander in the recently formed Dominican National Army, in 1930
.  Although the original agreement between Urena and Trujillo involved Urena 23
becoming president, Trujillo showed that in the quest for power any alliance could be 
broken.  Using his prestige in the military, Trujillo quickly deposed Urena and installed 
himself president and Chief Benefactor of the Dominican Republic. 
If in the 1890s electricity was implicated, at least on a symbolic level, in 
problematic political and economic developments in the Dominican Republic, this 
perspective did not lessen with the establishment of the United State’s Customs 
Receivership in 1905 and the advent of the U.S. military government in 1916. 
Electricity’s relationship to modernization, and modernization’s relationship to foreign 
intervention and the loss of economic and political sovereignty did help ensure that the 
electricity industry, which was owned by a U.S. company, would become a strategic part 
of Rafael Trujillo’s efforts at casting his acquisition of foreign-owned businesses and 
financial interests in nationalist and paternalist terms.  It is under Trujillo that the 
23 ​See Calder a detailed historical account of the period of United States military occupation from 1916 to 
the establishment of the provisional Dominican government.  Frank Moya Pons writes, “To some extent the 
government of…Vasquez was merely an extension of the U.S. Military occupation” (1995:342).   
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Dominican electricity grid began to disseminate across the country, integrating itself into 
the daily lives of people outside of the larger urban centers and becoming a service 
commodity along side water and telephone service (2003:235).   
The meaning of the impact of U.S. intervention in the region, like electricity’s 
ambiguous meaning in the 1890s, has the potential to be read as a blessing or a curse 
depending on one’s perspective.  As Bruce Calder (1984) has shown, significant amounts 
of funding for infrastructure such as roads, electric transmission lines, hospitals, and 
housing came as a result of United States intervention.  The creation of the Dominican 
National Army also took place under United States’ tutelage, the consolidation of which 
would assist Rafael Trujillo in establishing and maintaining his regime.  As I have 
mentioned above, the struggle for political and economic sovereignty is a theme that runs 
throughout Dominican history and in this regard U.S. intervention, both in its financial 
and military formations, was a serious blow to Dominican sovereignty and the perceived 
health of the nation.  The steps taken by the Trujillo regime to restore financial 
independence to the republic were thus part of a broader ideological mission of 
manufacturing consent amongst the Dominican populace for Trujillo’s 
nationalist-patrimonial state. 
 Under Trujillo the Dominican government paid off its debt to the United States, 
an amount of nearly $10 million that originally grew from the U.S. government acquiring 
the debt owed to the San Domingo Improvement Company in the first decade of the 
1900s.  This debt had “provided one of the pretexts…for the U.S. occupation” and its 
liquidation took place “amid great nationalist fanfare” (2003:234). This served to reaffirm 
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Trujillo’s position as the Chief Benefactor of the Dominican Republic, the leader who 
reinvigorated the nation beyond any prior level and restored its sovereignty which had 
been compromised repeatedly since the Customs Receivership began in1905.  In 1954 
Trujillo’s government “retired $31,000,000 worth of internal bonds,” and an article ran in 
The New York Times ​ reading, “Trujillo’s government is one of few in the world that are 
not in the red” .  The state under Trujillo possessed an abundance of wealth due to a 24
burgeoning export economy spurned by Trujillo’s efforts at expanding the industrial 
capacity of the country and inflated sugar prices in the global economy due to shortages 
of tropical commodities after World War II.  Within this context the Dominican state 
could afford to think about and enact public projects that would attest to this singular 
moment in Dominican history, and, of course, to the symbolic debt owed Trujillo for his 
role in enabling the conditions making this moment of national strength and vigor 
possible.  The Christopher Columbus Memorial Lighthouse, was to be one such project. 
 
Trujillo and the Columbus Memorial Lighthouse  
Trujillo was widely credited as making the Dominican Republic into a ‘modern’ 
country.  In the U.S. press, “Trujillo’s Island” was called “modern and modernistic” 
while the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Ellis Briggs, commented “more 
over-all progress has been achieved [under Trujillo] than during the preceding 438 years 
since the discovery of the island by Columbus.”   Though symbolically connecting the 25
24 ​The New York Times, ​Jan. 6, 1954. 
25 ​The New York Times, April 12, 1953. Briggs quoted in Turits 2003:232.​ ​Though it seems that at the 
time few acknowledged the transformative role of the U.S. military government in overseeing 
infrastructural developments in the form of urban and (limited) rural construction projects and 
political-structural developments in the reformation of the Dominican government and military. 
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Dominican Republic of the 1940s with the island’s long history as Europe’s first 
encounter with the New World, the Columbus Lighthouse​ ​nevertheless demonstrated 
Trujillo’s power and command of the country, as well as his desire to project that image 
outward to the world.  It was decided during a conference in 1948 at the National 
University of Paraguay that the light emitted in rays of “sanguine red” from El Faro a 
Colon was to be a cross representing “Modern Progress” .  The very ability of the 26
Dominican Republic to undertake the production of such a structure, equipped with lights 
meant to project a cross thousands of feet into the air, showed the country to be modern 
in an unprecedented way.  The state’s concern with electricity, manifested here through 
the use of multiple lights beaming into the Caribbean sky, is one of the celebration and 
visibility of a modern Dominican Republic.   
The idea for ​El Faro a Colon​ is attributed to Antonio Delmonte y Tejada in his 
Historia de Santo Domingo​ published in 1852.  In an article published in ‘El Faro a 
Colon,’ a publication of speeches and articles organized by ​El Comite Ejecutivo 
Permanente Del Faro De Colon, ​Delmonte y Tejada ​ ​is called “the father of Dominican 
history” and the Dominican Republic’s “Herodotus” .   Delmonte y Tejada envisioned a 27
memorial that would connect the Dominican Republic of his day with its Spanish 
heritage and pride in being home to the first capital established by Europeans in the New 
World.  As Delmonte y Tejada conceived of it, the memorial would be located in “the 
first city of America,” Santo Domingo, at a “central point…close to the coast” .  El 28
26 ​El Faro a Colon, ​1952, ​Ano III, Num. VI, pp. 73-74.   
27.​El Faro a Colon, ​1952, ​Ano III, Num. VI, pp. 50. 
28 ​Quoted in​ ​El Faro a Colon, ​1952, ​Ano III, Num. VI, pp. 50. 
43 
 
Comite Ejecutivo Permanente Del Faro De Colon, established in 1949 at the behest of 
Rafael Trujillo, brought together politicians and intellectuals to discuss the historical 
importance and meaning of El Faro a Colon .  Inside of the structure would reside what 29
was believed to be the remains of Christopher Columbus, the Genoan explorer who 
claimed the island of Hispaniola for Spain in 1492.  From the top of the lighthouse 
multiple beams of light would stretch thousands of feet into the sky, acting as a beacon in 
theory visible throughout the Caribbean.  Although the foundations of El Faro a Colon 
were laid in 1948, the structure would not be completed until 1990 during the last years 
of Joaquin Balaguer’s second term as president-dictator. 
 
Electricity, Nationalization, and the Wealth of the State Under Trujillo 
The relative wealth of the Dominican Republic throughout the first quarter of the 
20 ​th​ century and into the era of Trujillo’s rule is directly related to the vicissitudes of 
sugar prices in the global commodities market.  Other products such as cacao, coffee, and 
tobacco also figured prominently into the country’s economic health, but during periods 
in which sugar was scarce in the global market, such as during World War I and II, this 
“rise in sugar prices had a positive effect on the whole Dominican economy.”  For 
example, the rise of sugar per the hundredweight during World War I, from $5.50 in 1914 
to $22.50 in 1920, resulted in a “sudden and gigantic expansion of the economy” and was 
called “Dance of the Millions” (1995:325).  Immediately following World War I, 
however, sugar prices declined in the 1930s, and Moya Pons argues that it is for this 
29 ​El Faro a Colon, ​1952, ​Ano III, Num. VI, pp. 50-51. 
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reason that Trujillo “never thought of taking charge of the sugar industry before World 
War II” (1995:364).  As Turits explains, “state discourse and policy had been at best 
ambivalent toward [the sugar industry], whose expansion ran counter to the regime’s 
nationalist-populist objectives” (2003:236-237).   
Once sugar prices began to grow during a shortage of sugar immediately 
following World War II, Trujillo’s attention turned toward establishing himself as the 
preeminent sugar producer in the Dominican Republic.  Mirroring the discourse that 
would be used regarding Trujillo’s nationalization of the country’s electricity system, 
Trujillo’s takeover of foreign-owned sugar enterprises was framed in nationalist terms. 
The acquisition of the interests of the West Indies Sugar Corporation, a United States 
company which owned 6 of 14 mills in the Dominican Republic, was hailed by the 
Dominican press as the “Dominicanization” of a foreign company that had “forgotten 
[its] obligations to the Dominican nation” (quoted in Turits 2003:237-240). Trujillo 
constructed his sugar empire using myriad tactics such as high taxes and arbitrarily but 
stringently enforced labor laws to oust foreign-owned companies .  Trujillo’s efforts at 30
turning “the Dominican state into a private business” (of which he would be the owner) 
lead to nationalization in industries other than sugar production (1995:375).  
In January of 1955, amidst Trujillo’s “overall pattern of harassing and 
appropriating foreign interests in the 1950s,” the Compania Electric de Santo Domingo, 
30 ​“Despite the pressure the regime was asserting, the major U.S. sugar firms were still not persuaded to 
sell…In 1954 the Dominican government declared workers’ living quarters provided by U.S. sugar 
companies a menace to public health and ordered the construction of satisfactory dwellings…within sixty 
days…But on April 10, 1956 the government informed the company that because the new housing was still 
not complete at one of its mills, the Department of Health would suspend its sugar operations” (Turits 
2003:239).  
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owned by the Central Public Utility Corporation in the United States, sold all of its assets 
and properties to the Dominican government for $13,200,000 .  The electricity sector of 31
the Dominican Republic would remain under state ownership until 1999.  Prior to 
purchasing the interests of the Central Public Utility Corporation, Trujillo had effectively 
politicized electricity by enacting a law in 1954 that required the president’s permission 
“before electricity…could be stopped to users who were unable to pay their bills, as ‘it is 
the duty of the State to take measures to protect its people…including those with the least 
resources’” (quoted in Turits 2003:240).  Electricity was mobilized through nationalizing 
the means of its generation and distribution and employing a nationalist-populist 
discourse explaining the significance of its nationalization.  Not unlike the woman 
Electricity who falls prey to the power and control of Thomas Edison, electricity served 
the interests of the Dominican state under Trujillo.  A result of this is that electricity 
became a commodity whose service to Dominicans—especially those who were unable 
to afford it—became the obligation of the state. 
“From the beginning,” writes Frank Moya Pons, Trujillo’s government was a 
regime of plunder organized to furnish him with total control of every economic 
enterprise existing in the country” (1995:359).  In a few short years Trujillo had complete 
monopoly control of the production and sale of salt and rice and a near complete 
monopoly of the country’s tobacco industry (1995:359-360).  However, electricity would 
not be nationalized until 1955.  In part this is because early in his regime the national 
electric grid was only in the process of disseminating.  As the Dominican state budget 
31 The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1955.  Turits 2003:240, 341.47.  In keeping with a trend that saw Trujillo 
acquiring foreign-interests for far less than their actual worth, the price of $13, 200,000 was 28 percent 
below the estimated $18 million value of the U.S. company’s interests.   
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grew under Trujillo’s control of the economy, “water, power, light, and telephone 
systems spread across the country” (2003:235).  There is a second probable reason 
electricity was not nationalized until 1955.  Richard Turits (2003) has shown that into the 
early 1950s Trujillo’s grip on the Dominican Republic was firmly established not only 
via military and police force and state-ownership of a majority of industries, but via 
Trujillo’s efforts at successfully crafting an ‘alternative modernity’ that defended the 
country’s rural peasantry from sugar interests encroaching on peasants’ agricultural land. 
Nationalization of the country’s electricity system was at least in part a strategic decision 
made as Trujillo’s personal sugar empire approached its most dramatic heights, the net 
effect of which was an increasingly alienated rural peasantry.  And after Trujillo spent 
over $30 million on the world fair in 1955, upsetting the country’s balance of payments, 
his support began to wane in other sectors of the population as well (1995:373).  Turits 
writes, “the expansion of sugar…reflected a 1950s regime characterized by growing 
arrogance, miscalculations, and illusions” (2003:246). 
It is important to emphasize that with the electricity sector under state ownership 
and state coffers filled to the brim due to the nationalization of other sectors of the 
economy, Trujillo had the ability to align words and things and make his discourse 
surrounding electricity as a citizen’s right a reality.  His intentions in this regard were 
made clear by the promulgation of a 1954 electricity law mentioned above, but with the 
industry under his control it was his to develop and utilize as a political tool.  A year after 
the sector’s nationalization, Trujillo was making plans to lift the country’s generating 
capacity from 61,500 to 159,000 kilowatts by constructing steam generating plants.  This 
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hike in generating capacity would also benefit from the construction of an “atomic energy 
plant to supply a new industrial area and shipyard” .  But though Trujillo dressed his 32
words in the rhetoric of nationalism and paternalism, the dictator had other plans for 
electricity that belied his desire for accumulating capital through unceasing economic 
expansion.  In 1954 The New York Times reported a ‘new phase’ in tourism was 
beginning under Trujillo.  At nearly the same moment as the nationalization of the 
electricity sector, the Dominican government was enacting a “new policy of ending 
government monopoly of tourist facilities to permit operation by private interests.”  The 
redecoration and air conditioning of the rooms in The Jaragua, newly leased to “an 
experienced group of Miami Beach hotel men, exemplifies the dictator’s growing interest 
in tourism during the last six years of the regime .   33
When the plans to construct the Columbus Lighthouse are placed beside the 
political economic developments of the 1950s, which saw the Trujillo regime move 
“from a project of modernity based on political inclusion…of an economically 
independent peasantry to one based increasingly on the regime’s own large capitalist 
enterprises,” Trujillo’s motivation for nationalizing the country’s electricity industry 
appears more complex than being simply a political maneuver to garner support 
(2003:233).  Nevertheless, Trujillo outwardly framed economic nationalization as a 
display of the state’s paternal benevolence.  The lighthouse​ ​was not immune from this 
complex of motivation and rhetoric.   
32 The New York Times, Aug. 17, 1956. 
33 The New York Times, April 11, 1954​.  ​This is not to say that Trujillo had not been attune up to 1954 to 
the potential of the Dominican Republic to become a Caribbean tourist hub.  At the 1939 World’s Fair in 
New York, Ciudad Trujillo was marketed as a future “tourist destination and center of commerce” 
(Krohn-Hansen 2001:172). 
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Besides serving to connect symbolically the Dominican Republic to its 
Spanish-Catholic ‘discoverer’ Columbus, the memorial was imagined as something that 
would draw tourists from around the world, reflecting another of Trujillo’s plans to 
expand his personal enterprises in the country.  In a New York Times article that 
appeared in 1953, the Columbus Memorial Lighthouse was touted as a “grandiose 
project” that will attract tourists to “Trujillo’s Island” .  The article also mentioned, 34
“several villages have been moved out to make room for [the lighthouse],” the 
euphemism ‘moved out’ concealing the forced relocation of some of Santo Domingo’s 
poorest citizens to other impoverished neighborhoods surrounding the ​zona colonial, ​ the 
section of the capital with the most appeal to tourists seeking a glimpse of Santo 
Domingo’s Spanish colonial history.  For that particular segment of the population of 
Santo Domingo, ​El Faro a Colon ​could have been little more than a reminder of their 
own poverty and insignificance in the eyes of the state, except perhaps at the level of 
rhetoric.   
Largely due to a lack funding from countries that had originally promised to 
financially back project, construction plans for the lighthouse were put on hold. 
Nevertheless, the ambitious size and scope of the state’s plans for it in the late 1940s 
would be far surpassed as Trujillo began to consolidate his ‘sugar empire’ by 
nationalizing nearly every industry present in the Dominican Republic (statistic from 
Moya Pons?).  Through the Columbus Lighthouse electricity was mobilized by the state 
in a symbolic display of the strength and modernity of the Dominican nation.  Electricity 
34 ​The New York Times, April 12, 1953 
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had not yet been mobilized in terms of being a service to citizens for which the state 
would be responsible.  In 1955 Ciudad Trujillo hosted The World Fair of Peace and 
Brotherhood, an extravagant state-funded commemoration that celebrating Trujillo’s 25 
years in power and epitomizing the ability of the Trujillo state to craft a ‘magical 
modernity’ (Derby 1998).  The fair cost the state approximately $30,000,000, a price that 
upset the balance of payments which Trujillo had made a central accomplishment during 
his regime (1995:373). 
It is within the context of an alienated peasantry and urban poor population that 
Trujillo crafted the seizure of foreign-owned interests into a demonstration of paternal 
nationalism done for the good of the country.  The nationalization of the electricity 
industry became an essential facet of this project, undertaken to shore up his regime in 
the eyes of Dominicans watching as ​El Jefe’s ​ personal wealth grew immensely in 
proportion to his sugar empire while their own interests slowly gave way to the 
accumulation of capital.  Tourism became another potential source of capital that Trujillo 
planned to develop, and his regime identified electricity as essential to this industry’s 
growth and the growth of the country’s economy in general. 
This chapter focused on how electricity was twice mobilized under the 
dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo serving to shape perceptions of his regime as supporting a 
nationalist-populist agenda.  I used ​El Faro a Colon​ to demonstrate the changes taking 
place within his regime that would eventually undermine is rule amongst a large swath of 
the Dominican population.  These changes were the turn toward the state’s accumulation 
of capital and its undertaking of projects that did little more than demonstrate the degree 
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to which Dominicans were growing alienated from their ruler.  As I show in the next 
section, under the authoritarian presidencies of Joaquin Balaguer (1966-1978, 
1986-1996) electricity circulated within transforming economic and political 
circumstances—specifically, the growth of the tourist industry and free-trade 
manufacturing; the beginnings of a political orientation toward free market neoliberal 
economy—that set the groundwork for the political and economic shift supported by the 
election of Leonel Fernandez in 1996.  
 
Section V - Electricity and Political Economy in the post-Trujillo Era 
 
Before proceeding further I will summarize what I have shown thus far regarding 
the political economy of electricity in the Dominican Republic and electricity’s position 
within the relationship between the Dominican state and its citizens.  I showed how 
electricity moved from something that figured symbolically into discourses pertaining to 
the effects modernization and economic change in the Dominican Republic in the late 
19 ​th​ century to a commodity mobilized for political means under the dictatorship of 
Rafael Trujillo.  Using as a starting point Lauren Derby’s argument that gift giving by the 
Trujillo state was an essential factor in manufacturing consent for the dictator’s rule, I 
showed how Trujillo presented nationalization of the country’s electricity industry as a 
protectionist, patrimonial act of the state by which the regime intended to regain the 
consent of a population finding itself increasingly alienated by Trujillo’s capitalist 
policies.  By presenting electricity as a gift of the state in exchange for political consent 
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and allegiance, consumers increasingly perceived access to electricity service to be their 
right as Dominican citizens.  With the electricity sector—operated by the Dominican 
Electric Company (CDE)—under the ownership of the Dominican state, it became a 
responsibility of the Dominican state to provide access to electricity for its citizens as part 
of the relationship constructed between the state and electricity consumers under Trujillo. 
This section looks at the political and economic transformations and 
circumstances over the course of three decades, approximately from 1966 to 1996, that 
saw a decline under the presidencies of Joaquin Balaguer in the state’s ability to utilize 
electricity as a mobilized commodity as was the situation under Trujillo.  This section 
follows electricity into the post-Trujillo era and addresses how social, political, and 
economic transformations beginning in the 1970s—in combination with the political 
economic position of electricity established in the late years of Trujillo’s rule—made it 
increasingly unfeasible for the state to maintain its grip on the production (and therefore 
on the cost paid by consumers) of electricity. At the end of this section the focus returns 
to the Columbus Memorial Lighthouse and how its completion under Balaguer in 1992, 
and Balaguer’s decision to cancel the memorial’s inauguration ceremony, demonstrates 
the last hurrah of electricity’s position as a commodity mobilized by the state as a means 
of securing stability and popular acquiescence to the administration in power. 
 
Joaquin Balaguer and The Political Economy of Electricity, 1966-1978  
For a number of reasons demand for electricity among citizens, or residential 
consumers, grew throughout the post-Trujillo era.  Given a strong boost by Trujillo’s 
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policies of industrialization, urban populations began to increase dramatically in the 
post-Trujillo years and growing numbers of businesses and residents sought access to the 
grids of cities such as Santo Domingo, Santiago, and Barahona .  Per capita electricity 35
consumption also grew as personal electronics such as televisions and radios, as well as 
amenities such as air conditioning, became more common.  For example, between 1965 
and 1989, the number of televisions per 1,000 Dominicans grew from 13 to 82 (Hartlyn 
1998:285). Neici Zeller has also pointed out that during Balaguer’s first extended 
presidency, buildings constructed as public works by the government were designed to 
accommodate air conditioning, thereby adding another commodity to increasingly 
‘Americanized’ Dominican consumption practices .   36
Under the ownership of the Dominican state, sugar continued to be an important 
and profitable export commodity contributing to Balaguer’s ability to maintain a 
relatively tranquil economic front in the country despite the first indications of oil’s 
steady climb upward in price per barrel after the first Organization of the Petroleum 
exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting in 1968. In the early 1970s the state under Balaguer 
faced a large surplus of funds for two reasons.  First, between 1965 and 1973, the country 
received on average $94 million per year from the United States, most “in the form of 
long-term low-interest loans for development programs” which mandated that the 
government build ports, highways, streets, and electricity plants (1995:397-400).  Due to 
35 In 1960 60 percent of the Dominican population lived in rural areas in contrast to 84 percent in 1920 
(1995:376).  Estimations from 1990 found that 60.4 percent of the country’s 7.2 million people lived in 
urban areas and in 1993 censuses found that approximately 30 percent of the total population lived in the 
National district area in and surrounding Santo Domingo (1998:137, country studies 2001:496). 
36 This point was brought to my attention in a conversation with Neici Zeller of the University of Illinois, 
Chicago. 
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foreign investment and public and private investment from domestic sources, in the early 
1970s the Dominican Republic had one of the highest levels of growth in the Caribbean 
and Latin America; in total, between 1966 and 1971 approximately $1 billion was 
invested in the Dominican economy, the majority of which came from the United States 
(1995:399).  Second, Dominican-produced sugar was given a large import quota by the 
United States (700,000 tons in 1973, for example) in the years after Balaguer came to 
power until 1973.  Coming in the wake of Trujillo’s assassination and the civil war that 
followed in 1965, this quota system “cushioned the Dominican sugar industry against 
adverse fluctuations” in the market price of sugar, allowing “losses in the free market” to 
be “offset by gains under the quota” (1981:309).  
Although Balaguer maintained a firm grip on the Dominican economy, private 
business was allowed access to the Dominican Republic to a degree that had been 
impossible under Trujillo.  Balaguer continued to rule “in a patrimonial fashion, ensuring 
that he was the central axis around which all other major political and economic forces 
revolved,” but he nevertheless promoted “the development of business groups separate 
from…the state” (2001:46).  During the twelve years comprising Balaguer’s first 
presidential regime sugar and tourist operations moved to the fore in government 
priorities and began receiving “substantial incentives.” In the early 1970s foreign 
investment helped to make the country’s economic growth one of the highest in Latin 
America and this trend has continued, with some interruption, to the present .  Moya 37
Pons explains that when concerns were raised regarding the amount of U.S. capital being 
37 U.S. Department of State country profile.  ​http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35639.htm​. The upward 
trajectory of foreign investment is illustrated by the fact that in 2004, United States foreign direct 
investment alone reached $1 billion, an increase of $184 million dollars from a year earlier (1995:400). 
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invested in the country, which some thought ought to be “limited…or expropriated,” 
Balaguer defended what he called the “geopolitical destiny” of the republic.  “By this he 
meant that…the Dominican Republic would always be” the United State’s “satellite in 
the region” (1995:402).   
After the assassination of Rafael Trujillo civil war erupted as political leaders and 
their parties attempted to consolidate in the aftermath of the dictatorship, looking for a 
way to seize power while maintaining a democratic front as the United States looked on38
.  U.S. influence in the Dominican Republic, as we have seen above, extends to the late 
19 ​th​ century with the acquisition of the republic’s debt by the San Domingo Improvement 
Company.  With the advent of the cold war in the years following World War II, and in 
response to the establishment of a communist state in Cuba, the U.S. maintained a 
tenuous relationship with the Trujillo regime, lending support to the regime until its 
transgressions in the late 1950s lead to sanctions by the Organization of American States 
and a subsequent drop in U.S. approval of Trujillo’s policies.  Intending to prevent a 
communist takeover in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo’s assassination, the U.S. 
landed troops in Santo Domingo to quell political infighting and help reestablish political 
semblance, albeit with a leaning toward cooperation with U.S. policies in the Caribbean 
region.  In this sense Balaguer’s acknowledgement of the ‘geopolitical destiny’ of the 
Dominican Republic fits in line with U.S. goals for the region in the cold war era.   
With the electricity sector under government control and ownership it fell to the 
state to operate and supply electricity as demand for it grew amongst industry and the 
38 ​For a more thorough account than provided here of the 1965 civil war and U.S. occupation see Kryzanek 
and Wiarda (1988:41-48). 
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population. The electricity industry also benefited from these years of financial 
abundance. Although power outages did occur, electricity supply in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s saw substantial growth.  In 1967, the CDE produced 618 kilowatt hours of 
electricity versus a sixty percent increase to 993 million in 1971 (Bell 1981:354). As 
mentioned briefly above, with the Dominican Electric Company under ownership of the 
state the government actively intervened in keeping the electric company afloat despite 
incurring financial losses.  Beginning with the nationalization of the electricity industry 
in 1955 and into the 1960s and 70s under Balaguer, the government actively held down 
the price of electricity as against its market cost by subsidizing the CDE (1981:354). 
This contributed to the losses incurred by the CDE, which was paying more for electricity 
generation than it was receiving in payments for electricity sold to consumers.  As Ian 
Bell points out, this benefited not only residential consumers who either paid prices 
below the actual cost of electricity or did not pay at all, but also benefited industry “as 
much as any other sector of the economy” (1981:354). 
 
The Struggles of the Dominican Electric Company 
These years of growth had stopped by the late 1970s. Investment in new plants 
slowed as the CDE—no longer able to rely on a corresponding increase in government 
subsidy—found itself without the means to invest in new plants and fully maintain the 
existing (Bell 1981:354).  Little change came with the equally financially strapped 
administrations of Guzman and Blanco.   Under Balaguer the CDE had difficulty meeting 
the country’s growing demand for electricity.  This was in large part due to “plant 
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deterioration and from the [CDE’s lack of] investment in new plants” (Bell 1981:354). In 
the late 1970s the CDE was “perennially in the red” mainly due to the Dominican 
government’s policy of “holding the price of electricity down” as the cost of its 
generation grew (1981:354).  One reason for the increasing cost of electricity in this 
period can be found in the rising cost of oil.  Bell shows that in 1971 10.3 percent of the 
total amount of electricity generated by the CDE came from fuel oil generators.   
By 1977 fuel oil generators accounted for 15 percent of electricity production 
(1981:354). As Fernando Coronil has shown, oil prices began their precipitous rise in the 
late 1960s due to actions taken by OPEC as a result of the third and fourth Arab-Israeli 
wars of 1967 and 1973 (Coronil 1997:56) .  Rising oil costs reverberated through out the 39
Dominican economy. In the late 1970s fluctuations in the market price of oil thus had an 
effect on electricity production as the state was forced repeatedly to bail out the CDE as it 
struggled to supply consumers.  During the last years of Balaguer’s three-term 
presidency, beginning in 1976 oil prices increased dramatically leading to a tenfold 
increase in the Dominican Republic’s petroleum import bill.  At the same time sugar 
prices which had been substantially high enough in the late 1960s and early 70s to “offset 
oil price increases” were dropping in price along side other Dominican exports such as 
tobacco (2001:145).   
As demand for electricity grew it became increasingly difficult for the Dominican 
government, as the owner of the means of electricity generation and production, to supply 
39 ​Coronil writes that the abilities of OPEC to set the market price of oil, resulting from a shift “from a rent 
the level of which was determined by the market price to a market price determined by the level of rent,” 
enabled OPEC to use oil “as a political weapon” in its dealings with Western countries such as the U.S. 
(1997:56). 
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electricity to citizens at subsidized prices.  As we have seen, the Dominican state under 
Trujillo intervened in electricity production by nationalizing the country’s electricity 
industry, effectively mobilizing electricity to shore up political support amongst the 
populace. However, as the cost of oil increased and sugar profits decreased in the late 
1970s, the Dominican state under Balaguer could not maintain control of the country’s 
electorate in the face of democratic elections; in a sense, the gifting relationship between 
the Dominican state and citizens that began under Trujillo could no longer be upheld due 
to a number of economic issues, as I have shown above.   
The country’s growing tourist industry, built upon hotels and resorts catering to 
patrons who expected the luxury of air conditioning and functioning electrical outlets for 
televisions and other electronic items, should have helped the CDE’s financial situation 
by plugging into the national grid. As an increasingly vibrant sector of the national 
economy, hotels and resorts would have been able to contribute regular payments to the 
CDE.  This also applied to the country’s growing export-manufacturing sector, which 
depended as well on electricity to run manufacturing and assembly machinery.  However, 
with the CDE unable to provide consistent electricity supply, many hotels, resorts, and 
free trade zones began to rely on private generators to whom payment did not benefit the 
CDE.  According to the Inter-American Development Bank, by 1989 approximately half 
of the country’s electricity supply was provided by privately-owned small-scale 
generating facilities; Hartlyn explains, “this represented the most inefficient de facto form 
of privatization imaginable, leading to further foreign-exchange expenditures—both for 
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the oil to run the generators and the machines themselves, which were more inefficient 
than an effective national power grid could tolerate” (Hartlyn 1998:326).   
Balaguer’s regime operated in a patrimonial-authoritarian fashion that was in 
many regards a continuation of Trujillo’s policies, but when it became apparent after the 
1978 elections that Balaguer might try to upset the elections, the administration of Jimmy 
Carter in the United States and a number of Latin American and European groups leant 
“firm opposition” to any interference by Balaguer (2001:47).  Two democratically elected 
presidents served terms from 1978 to 1986 (S. Antonio Guzman from 1978-1982 and 
Salvador Jorge Blanco from 1982-1986) and during this span of eight years several 
important political developments occurred regarding the government’s role in the 
national economy, which I address below. And while these developments would have 
lasting ramifications, this period of eight years would ultimately be a short break from 
Balaguer’s political rule; in 1986 Balaguer was reelected and would spend another ten 
uninterrupted years as president.   
 
 
1978-1986: The Years Between Balaguer 
With the election of Jorge Blanco in 1982, the Dominican Republic entered into 
its first dealings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but even when the 
government agreed to transfer payments for imported goods to the free-market exchange 
rate, privatizing the CDE was not presented as an option.  This enabled the government to 
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protect the price of electricity from fluctuations in the market price of electricity . 40
Petroleum was also withheld from deregulation of the price of imported goods. And 
while the political economic history of oil in the Dominican Republic would make as 
interesting a study as this, there is no room for it here.  That said, electricity continued to 
function throughout the administrations of Antonio Guzman and Jorge Blanco, though in 
a diminished fashion, as part of the Dominican state’s patrimonial approach to goods and 
the economy .   41
For reasons addressed above, until the last years of Balaguer’s first three 
consecutive administrations the republic saw economic stability and relative prosperity in 
the state coffers.  With the end of the generous United States sugar quota, a general 
decline in the market price of sugar, and the rise in oil prices in the late 1970s, the 
Dominican government found its balance of payments for the national debt returning to 
the red.  Prior to his inauguration in 1982, Jorge Blanco sought contacts with the IMF for 
financial assistance and a program of financial stabilization (Hartlyn 1998:174-175). 
Hartlyn writes that at that point “there were few realistic options for the country other 
than negotiating with the IMF.” Despite large-scale riots that were violently subdued by 
Dominican armed forces (see footnote 40), between 1985 and 1986 the government 
successfully complied with an IMF stand-by program (Metz 2001:49).  Nevertheless, as 
Hartlyn has argued, the culminating effect of Blanco’s engagement with the IMF was 
40 ​Exposure of the electricity industry to even a modicum of deregulation, as happened in the mid-1990s 
when the government signed an agreement with independent power producers lead to significantly raised 
electricity prices (World Bank Report No. 31741-DO, 8) 
41 ​Despite the precautionary decision to exclude petroleum from price deregulation, the subsequent rise in 
the price of imported foodstuffs was enough to cause popular unrest culminating in the “IMF riots” of April 
1984 (see, Hartlyn 1998:179). 
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ultimately the reelection of Joaquin Balaguer in 1986.  Balaguer made electoral promises 
pertaining to privatizing and stabilizing the national economy—of which the electricity 
industry was of course a part—though without reliance upon the IMF.  Upon election 
“Balaguer abandoned all his electoral promises…and ran the country against all 
free-market principles” (1995:427).   
According to Frank Moya Pons, Balaguer decided upon his reelection in 1986 that 
he would stay in power until his death (1995:423).  The policy guiding his presidency 
was to resuscitate the Dominican economy without relying upon IMF assistance as Jorge 
Blanco had done.  Balaguer ran the country as an economic dictatorship and planned to 
boost the economy through “dramatic increases in public investment, especially in 
construction and public works” (Hartlyn 1998:193).  Balaguer planned to commemorate 
the 500 ​th​ anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s discovery of ‘the New World’ in 1992 
by completing El Faro a Colon, the project whose foundations were laid in 1948 during 
Trujillo’s rule.  As was the plan in 1948, the Columbus Lighthouse would project beams 
of light thousands of feet into the air making the shape of a cross in the sky.  As Balaguer 
prepared to use light and electricity to commemorate Columbus, the CDE—which 
Balaguer had declared under his personal control at the start of his term in 1986—was 
suffering its most severe setbacks, resulting in daily, multiple hour-long power outages. 
By 1989, the third year of Balaguer’s term, “no person, household or business [plugged 
into the national grid] could receive more than three hours of electricity per day” 
(1995:431).  Despite such extreme set backs Balaguer decided to push on with his plan 
for the lighthouse. 
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A Gift No longer: Balaguer and The Columbus Memorial Lighthhouse 
Balaguer’s decision to complete the lighthouse and turn its inauguration ceremony 
into an international spectacle by inviting the Pope and other foreign dignitaries 
demonstrated with clarity that under Balaguer something had gone awry with the 
patrimonial state (Krohn-Hansen 2001:166).  Under Trujillo, state-sponsored spectacles 
such as the World Fair of Peace and Brotherhood, as well as the aborted effort to 
construct El Faro a Colon, were acceptable because it was clear to citizens that they still 
commanded a certain amount of focus from the regime in power.  In 1992 this was not 
the case.  It was apparent that Balaguer was more concerned with projecting outward 
symbols of national strength and historical pride than with the actual concerns of 
Dominican citizens.  Krohn-Hansen (2001) has analyzed the completion of the Columbus 
Lighthouse in terms of ‘political cosmologies,’ pointing to the history of racial exclusion 
in the Dominican Republic, primarily regarding Haitians and darker-skinned Dominicans, 
and this history’s relationship to Columbus and his European heritage.  Krohn-Hansen 
does not, however, address the degree to which the state was or was not successful in 
using the Columbus Lighthouse to construct such a racially exclusive political 
cosmology.  As will become clear, completion of the lighthouse was far from acceptable 
for many Dominicans, not because of what it represented in terms of political 
constructions of Dominican race and history (though in some respects this was indeed the 
case) but because of what the lighthouse demonstrated to Dominicans regarding their 
strained relationship to the Dominican state.   
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Michel-Rolph Trouillot, writing about the 1992 commemorations in Europe, the 
Caribbean, and the United States for the quincentennial of Columbus’s landing in the 
New World, explains, “commemorations sanitize…the messy history lived by actors 
[and] contribute to the continuous myth-making process that gives history its more 
definite shapes: they help to create, modify, or sanction the public meanings attached to 
historical events deemed worthy of mass celebration” (Trouillot 1995:116).  To some 
degree it is assumed here that state-sponsored commemorations—constructions of a 
specific perspective of a national history, in this case via the Columbus Lighthouse in the 
Dominican Republic—are unequivocally accepted by citizens who buy into the historical 
reading performed by the state via the commemoration.  The degree to which a public 
commemoration such as the Columbus Lighthouse is accepted or rejected by citizens 
reveals not only citizens’ agency to ascribe or not ascribe to the state’s reading of history, 
but also has the potential to reveal tensions in the very relationship of the state to its 
citizens.   
In late September, 1992, Balaguer cancelled the inauguration of the Columbus 
Memorial Lighthouse, scheduled for the first week of October to commemorate the 500​th 
anniversary of Columbus’s landing in the New World.  Though violent protests had been 
taking place during the previous week in response to the murder of a human rights 
organizer by the Dominican police, protests had become increasingly frequent beginning 
in the late 1980s.  With the Pope planning a five-day visit for the inauguration, the 
government wanted to minimize social protests and demonstrations. The protests that 
lead Balaguer to cancel the inauguration of the Columbus Lighthouse were part of a trend 
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in the late 1980s of growing social unrest in different sections of the Dominican 
population in response to the policies of the Balaguer administration.  Since the late 1985 
”urban, territorially based social movements” had been on the rise (Hartlyn 1998:198). 
Hartlyn points to “economic crisis” and a “growing disillusionment with [Balaguer’s 
party, the PRD] and…politics in general” (198).   Hartlyn adds that problematic 
electricity supply was also an important factor in the cause of growing discontent in 
urban areas.  That the government planned to inaugurate a gigantic lighthouse while 
electricity supply was dropping to as little as three hours a day did not escape people’s 
attention.  As the New York Times reported, the lighthouse became “a lightening rod for 
critics and a source of trouble like few others” in Balaguer’s career .  The article 42
continues: 
 
“[That] the country’s electricity supply is notoriously unreliable…only adds to the 
sense of bitterness many say they feel about a lighthouse whose 30 
billion-candlepower lights are said to be able to produce a cross-shaped 
beam…visible as far away as Puerto Rico.” 
 
The inauguration of the Columbus Lighthouse took place on October 6, 1992, though the 
ceremony was significantly reduced in size.  “There will be a simple ceremony of laying 
flowers at the monument, and that is all,” said Peter Morales Troncoso, the director of the 
Dominican Permanent Commission for the Celebration of the Fifth Centennial .   43
That the Balaguer administration cancelled canceled the initial plans for the 
lighthouse’s inauguration is demonstrative of both the widespread disagreement that 
42 ​The New York Times,​ September 25, 1992. 
43 ​The New York Times,​ September 25, 1992. 
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existed amongst Dominicans regarding the state’s interpretation of Columbus’s role in 
Dominican history and the shaping of Dominican identity, and of the dissatisfaction 
Dominican citizens felt toward the policies of the Balaguer administration.  The 
contradictions inherent in a state-sponsored celebration that made extensive use of 
electric lighting while recurring power outages characterized everyday life for a wide 
swatch of the population was intolerable.  Balaguer would remain in power until 1996 
when Leonel Fernandez and his plans for economic and political modernization gained 
the support of the Dominican electorate.  Thus the cancellation and subsequent 
downsizing of the Columbus Lighthouse inauguration ceremony symbolized the 
impending end of the patrimonial state in the Dominican Republic, and at the bottom of 
this transformation lay electricity.   
In this section I looked at electricity in the post-Trujillo era and how a confluence 
of factors, from rising oil prices and declining sugar prices to the lack of upkeep of 
state-owned generating plants, made it increasingly difficult for the Dominican state to 
utilize electricity as a mobilized commodity as it had been in the later years of Trujillo’s 
regime.  I pointed to the protests surrounding the inauguration of the Columbus Memorial 
Lighthouse as indicative of the end of the patrimonial state in the Dominican Republic. 
The consumption of electricity by the lighthouse, a state-sponsored construction, despite 
substantially diminished electricity supply for citizens showed Dominicans that the sort 
of alignment between state and citizen fostered by Trujillo and carried over into the first 
Balaguer administration no longer existed.  
 
65 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I used electricity in its commodity form as a lens through which I 
viewed the history of relations between the Dominican state and citizens during the 20​th 
century.  I left off in the years immediately preceding the 1996 presidential election of 
Leonel Fernandez.  This paper sought to offer a novel approach to analyzing the political 
and economic shift that occurred at the state level under Fernandez.  After over a 
half-century of state control of the national economy, Fernandez’s election brought 
widespread privatization and an embrace by the Dominican state of neoliberal economic 
policy.   
At the end of the 19​th​ century, as large-scale agriculture and the modernizing 
tendencies of Ulises Heureaux propelled forward a transformation of the Dominican 
landscape, electricity was both a tangible sign of ‘progress’ through modernization and a 
reminder of the costs to sovereignty and independence that such progress could, and 
eventually would, entail for the nation.  Because electricity is a commodity that circulates 
through the every day lives of consumers, control of its production and transmission 
served the political designs of the state under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo.  With 
Trujillo’s decision to nationalize the country’s electricity industry, electricity became a 
gift whose exchange for political consent amongst citizens would make it a significant 
commodity aspect of the relationship between citizens and the Dominican state. 
With its production and transmission the responsibility of the state, the 
administrations of Joaquin Balaguer found electricity supply to be increasingly a point of 
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contention in state-citizen relations.  Sugar no longer brought the revenue it did under 
Trujillo and during the early years of Balaguer’s first administration and the state’s grip 
on the national economy had slowly weakened since the dictator’s assassination.  It 
therefore became difficult for the state-owned Dominican Electric Company (CDE) to 
provide electricity as demand for its service grew yearly.  Still, privatization was not 
considered during Balaguer’s tenure.  Balaguer was aware of the value of keeping 
electricity under state control, which enabled the state to absorb losses incurred by the 
CDE as it continued to offer electricity to Dominicans at prices below the market cost. 
This relationship became untenable as losses from the CDE began to deprive the state of 
detrimental amounts of money.   
As a commodity, electricity will continue to provide an interesting analytical lens 
with which to focus on the intersection of state politics, the everyday lives of citizens, 
and the role of economics—both micro and macro—on the dynamics of this relationship. 
My research was limited as an undergraduate at the University of Michigan   
by time constraints and the inaccessibility of certain materials that could be accessed only 
in the Dominican Republic.  I believe that service commodities such as electricity offer a 
valuable way of looking at nation-states and the citizens who lay at their heart.  As I hope 
has become clear, the theoretical approach of cultural anthropology has much to offer 
disciplines such as political science and economics, both of which, if I may be permitted 
a broad generalization, appear to be lacking the human aspect of their respective 
intellectual foci.  It is humans who live within and comprise the systems, markets, and 
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societies that are studied, and behind each question it should be remembered that the 
answer always involves some number of living, breathing individuals.   
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